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Abstract: The ethical dimension of treating the elderly, including risk–benefit analysis, focuses 
mainly on quality of life and end-of-life issues. These include arguments on advance directives 
and the concept of extraordinary treatments. This paper looks more closely at the philosophical 
approach to aging in order to address questions on the direction of research and issues such as 
longevity and social construction of the aging process. It is the way society moves to   understand 
the value-laden choices on aging that directs the goals of treatment and research. Whilst these 
vary culturally, one has to reckon with a postmodern view of aging which may, in turn, reflect 
on the course of action of future care and research in aging. The paper canvasses how, in   reality, 
four principles act as guidelines for moral discourse, and discusses how changing values in 
society decide this course of action.
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Introduction
Risk–benefit analysis with or without concern for legal issues has always been the 
mainstay of clinical practice. Beneficence, insofar as it is a principle in medicine, has to 
a greater or lesser degree always been based on this issue. Even under the “  accusation” 
that what physicians called beneficence was indeed “paternalism” (and hopefully 
this argument is resolved and exhausted now), whatever decisions doctors used to 
take was based on what in their opinion was in the patient’s best interests and for the 
patient’s good. Leaving patients ignorant of their disease and outside the realm of 
  decision-making was considered a therapeutic privilege and done in order to “protect” 
the patient from news which he or she did not or should not know in order to keep 
them from grief which could cause them more harm than good. Times changed and 
so did values. The term “values” is used in order to emphasize that it is not merely a 
question of relativism or simply because we understand human nature better. Rather 
it is because Western culture cherished the concept of autonomy. It was indeed the 
philosophical debate which contributed considerably to increasing the “principle” 
(in the Kantian sense) of respecting autonomy and trumping it over beneficence, until 
Beauchamp and Childress1 came around to give us (or rather, lay down what was in 
the air) the “four principles”. These evolved into an ethical framework and indeed 
doctors and health care providers were invoked to “use” these principles in their 
decision-making, calling them “mid-level” principles. Principlism came under attack2 
and the defenders went on to invoke methods of using principles, such as specifying 
and balancing. There was not one principle to overrule the other. Specification and Clinical Interventions in Aging 2010:5 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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balancing were meant to address the particular situation, yet 
steering away from situational ethics.
Assessing risk and benefit would fall under the principle 
of beneficence. There is overlap also with the principle of 
  justice because these decisions invariably also involve the 
use of resources that can be allocated elsewhere (  without, of 
course, bowing to utilitarianism, as indeed even a   deontologist 
must consider her duty to society). In the meantime, the field 
of gerontology and geriatric medicine has taken on new life, 
and rightly so; we are not only concerned with the elderly as 
a specific group, needing special needs with special   attention 
to differences in medical care, just as children need a   different 
approach to adults, but also because our populations, and 
perhaps cultures, are aging.3
Making decisions concerning risk–benefit for the elderly 
invariably therefore takes on a completely different dimension 
than for other adults, not only because where the elderly are 
concerned there is a different physiology and an aging body, 
but also because we are dealing with perhaps an aging culture, 
and more persistently so because we have to face the bottom 
line question: Is it worth treating this patient at this stage of 
life? Is it in their best interest? Is it in society’s best interests? 
These may be blunt questions, but it is a reality from which 
discussions of end-of-life decision-making ensue.
The issues of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, advance 
directives, and research into longevity have arisen. Because 
we are discussing an ethical concept, and not merely a 
clinical algorithm, what we have at base is our attitude, in 
philosophical terms, towards our elderly populations. We 
must distinguish what is common to all and how to deal with 
culture. This paper is divided into three parts, with perhaps 
some overlap. The first discusses the reality of principles 
as an ethical framework and whether in essence it is our 
values towards the above questions which define outcomes. 
Secondly, it discusses three real-world situations, the third 
of which discusses how we view elderly in this postmodern 
society.
Why principles and why conflict?
Decisions are usually based on inherent cultural beliefs from 
which emanate virtues and general principles. Inherently 
we are what we are because we have learned basic concepts 
throughout life which set the scene for our principles. But 
both the use of and the foundation of these principles are 
inherently attached to our concept of what “is” or should be 
right and wrong. A difference at this level, and you invoke 
a different reasoning on how the same principles are used to 
arrive at another different answer. Indeed when we deliberate 
a moral problem we start with an empathic feeling of what is 
right and what is wrong. We then use principles in defense of 
this position. Rational thought about a situation may allow us 
to change our course of action and perhaps the final decision, 
but our initial value system remains essentially unchanged. 
Indeed, it is probable that we have conflict amongst principles 
because we have different value systems. Gregory Tillett 
perhaps best explains this conflict.4
Tillett, in his analyses of resolving conflict distinguishes 
three concepts, or categories, of differences between ideas, 
humans, relationships, and between internal (within oneself) 
issues, ie, problems, disputes, and conflicts. A problem can 
be resolved by management, ie, “by the agreement on how 
something can or should be done”. We can easily conceive 
of a difficult clinical situation in which one consultant or 
family practitioner asks the advice of another, and doctors 
within a team discuss courses of action between themselves 
and with patients, especially within a context where there is 
refusal of a particular kind of treatment. Tillett points out 
that these problems can indeed become disputes and can 
generate conflict.4
A dispute occurs “when two (or more) people (or groups) 
perceive that their interests, needs, or goals are incompatible 
and they seek to maximize fulfilment of their own interests or 
needs, or achievement of their own goals (often at the expense 
of others)”. Consider, for example, the situation of an elderly 
woman who is being taken care of at her daughter’s home. 
This daughter has three brothers, one of whom had distanced 
himself from his sister due to a dispute with her husband. The 
main contention was that this brother convinced the others 
that their mother should be put in a home because he refused 
to visit her at their sister’s home. Of course, prima facie, the 
best interests of the patient were for her to remain at home. 
However, it transpired that the woman was very depressed 
because this son, who was evidently her favorite, was not 
visiting her. The undue pressure was indeed coercive and the 
woman conceded to go to the home in order to be able to see 
all her children, not at all a voluntary choice. In the meantime 
she needed hospitalization. After eight months in hospital 
and no remedy in finding a place at an institution, the deci-
sion had to be reversed to take into consideration again her 
best interests, ie, avoidance of a hospital infection. Because 
the daughter was still willing to take her back, this course 
of action was taken, and the necessary legal procurements 
arranged. At each stage however a value-laden decision was 
taken, which brings us to the third category, ie, conflict.
Conflict, again as defined by Tillett, “arises when two (or 
more) people (or groups) perceive that their values or needs Clinical Interventions in Aging 2010:5 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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are incompatible – whether or not they propose, at present or 
in the future, to take any action on the basis of those values”.4 
Whilst problems and disputes arise within specific situations, 
conflicts do not need one. Two parties can be in conflict 
because of beliefs or because of the values they uphold, 
and hence the heated debates on such issues as abortion and 
euthanasia. But, as in the case described here, we may find 
that superficially, at least, the people involved had the same 
values in that they all loved their mother, but when it came 
to taking a decision which was in the best interest of their 
mother, it was rather a decision in their own best interests 
which had become evident, until a situation arose which 
gave enough strength to override these different values. 
The difference in value was between one in which X would 
rather have his mother in a home and be able to see her (and 
perhaps that she would be able to enjoy him), and the same 
person admitting that notwithstanding that his mother would 
not be able to see him, his sister was in a better position to 
take care of her and that given the state of existing homes, 
she may be better off. Thus a question of values and needs 
come in. The conflict was that between X and the husband 
of X’s sister, and not the situation.
Admittedly there can be a hazy line between a dispute and 
a conflict, as in this case. One has to delve into the narrative 
of each participant in order to reveal a conflict and understand 
that the matter is not simply one of disputes. One can resolve 
the dispute and still not have handled the conflict. In this 
case, the brothers agreed that the mother be allowed to go 
to their sister’s home on the condition that the sister use her 
pension only and not the mother’s savings in order to take 
care of her, ie, if she needed a new bed or a commode, they 
were not willing to contribute to either. This coercion reveals 
the underlying conflict between the daughter’s husband and 
the dominant brother, notwithstanding a resolution of the 
conflict. It seems that the needs or values of the children 
trumped the needs of the mother or the value to respect and 
meet her needs. Certainly this was not a dispute any more 
but a conflict, which unfortunately the medical practitioner 
or team may not be able to handle, unless by enforcing legal 
processes which may not be in the interests of all parties and 
not so conducive to conflict resolution.
Following Heraclitus, “justice is conflict”.5 Doctors make 
decisions in the light of beneficence and at the same time 
doing justice to the person(s) and the situation at hand. By 
“doing justice”, we obviously do not merely mean that the 
situation is handled well and correctly (within, that is, the 
boundaries of standards of care), but we seek that justice is 
done morally. Deciding whose justice and which rationality is 
certainly not easy in the modern sense, especially in dealing 
with end-of-life situations, whether to treat or not to treat, 
whether to leave elderly for acute treatment at their home, 
or incur a more expensive, perhaps better treatment, but in a 
hospital setting. Certainly there can be hardly a better expo-
sition of this philosophical reality than that put forward by 
MacIntyre.5 Whether he does justice to the topic is probable 
but whether he resolves the dilemma is uncertain. Certainly 
he speaks extensively of tradition, which is “an argument 
extended through time”, in that it can be a medical tradition 
or a religious tradition or simply a tradition of “horse-riding”. 
However, what is certain is that sometimes traditions come 
into conflict. And they come into conflict because of their 
values and how they view justice. Solomon6 believes that 
morality cannot be reduced to any strict Kantian system of 
principles. The very fact that the four principles of health 
care require further specification and balancing shows that 
a deeper sense of the real situation is needed, and what this 
usually boils down to is the narrative of the parties involved 
who bring forth their values and needs. Principles can help 
us define and understand more clearly the issues at hand. 
Solomon does not particularly like MacIntyre’s use of tradi-
tions, in the sense that it still leaves open the nostalgia for 
religion and a sense of community, but goes on to admit that 
Aristotle did invoke a sense of community when speaking 
about virtues. Neither does he associate virtue with feminist 
ethics, values not being supposed to be held captive to gender, 
even though feminist ethics may have a point in contrasting 
male principles which are hard, oppressive, and impersonal, 
with the female virtues of warmth and caring. Colloquially, 
by having principles, we are actually talking about the val-
ues a person holds as well. Principles do indeed guide, but 
in themselves are guided by underlying values. If one has a 
so-called value for life and is not in favor of euthanasia, one 
invokes principles to lead one to this conclusion. Conversely, 
if one’s value system of life includes terminating suffering 
even by allowing physician-assisted suicide, then one will use 
the same four principles to reach the opposite goal.
Clinical decision-making
Having summarized the philosophical foundations on which 
risk–benefit analysis is based, various relevant clinical situa-
tions faced in health care are grouped. Jonsen et al7 classify 
three forms of disease and goals of medicine that are sum-
marized here with particular reference to care and decisions 
for the elderly. These authors say that “In the first, the patient 
suffers from an acute illness that, once diagnosed, can be 
readily treated and cured. In the second, the patient experi-Clinical Interventions in Aging 2010:5 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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ences a process that causes serious disabilities and which, 
while some relief can be provided, will progress despite 
treatment and eventually case death. In the third, the patient 
suffers a chronic disease that can be effectively treated so 
as to relieve many of the most debilitating effects”. For 
simplicity they use the acronyms ACURE (Acute, Critical, 
Unexpected, Responsive, and Easily diagnosed and treated), 
CARE (Critical, Active, Recalcitrant, and Eventual), and 
COPE (Chronic, Outpatient, Palliative, and Efficacious). 
Perhaps using simply “acute”, “critical”, and “chronic” would 
have been quite an accurate substitute, but these acronyms 
serve the purpose just as well and are applied here.
These authors point out that physicians habitually 
approach medical problems by attempting to determine 
the indications for or against medical intervention. They 
suggest that we face ethical dilemmas in the same way as 
well. In fact, assessing risk and benefit takes both medical 
intervention and ethical dilemmas to task, especially when 
considering elderly patients and when one asks oneself 
whether one should treat or not in a particular case. Medi-
cine remains a science of uncertainty; even these acronyms 
are understood as being probability statements rather than 
absolute designations. Indeed, uncertainty makes for good 
decision-making in the face of risk–benefit analysis, and 
not simply one of clinical competence but also one which is   
value-laden.
Most goals of the medical encounter are of the first group. 
These goals apply to acute and relatively straightforward 
conditions, especially once a diagnosis has been made. The 
situations may be critical and unexpected, such as meningitis, 
reversible and easily treated (by “easy” one of course does 
not mean easy in the strict sense, but that one knows what to 
do and has an immediate plan of action based on evidence-
based medicine and/or standards of care). Ethical issues in 
this situation may range from simply refusal of treatment 
to families not wishing the elderly patient to know. Recent 
literature suggests a more culturally sensitive approach in 
these clinical situations,8–10 respecting wishes which may 
be culturally sensitive. In Japan for example, it may be 
considered disrespectful to let an elderly person know of the 
medical condition, such that the sons and daughters take on 
the responsibility.
The second category (CARE) describes patients with 
active, progressive, and deleterious conditions. One can eas-
ily see many elderly people in such situations, although this 
is by no means restricted to this section of the population. 
Under this category lie most of the ethical dilemmas facing 
end-of-life decisions, such as withdrawing of life support, 
decisions not to intubate, decisions not to resuscitate, and 
irreversible coma/brain death. Advance directives are also at 
issue in this category. So are the mainline ethical discourses 
of ordinary versus extraordinary treatment, killing versus 
allowing to die, treating versus tender loving care, etc. These 
are situations that inherently carry legal issues. How would 
we distinguish between passive euthanasia and allowing 
someone to die? What is in fact ordinary and extraordinary 
treatment? Standards of care weigh in heavily. Even in invok-
ing the principle of “double effect” by using high doses of 
morphine, for example, to treat palliatively, knowing that 
there is a risk that the patient may die of the dose of morphine 
and that this was a foreseen but unintended consequence, one 
must understand the nature of increasing doses of morphine 
and not be caught in a dispute of hastening death by going 
about the principle of double effect. Indeed, even though 
the principle has four basic rules to it, it is heavily burdened 
on the moral agent to ascertain that it is morally and cor-
rectly invoked (just as it takes a moral agent, for example, 
not to abuse the Abortion Act in the UK). There is always a 
standard of care in increasing dose strengths, although this 
is a patient-sensitive decision and hence can be externally 
seen as subjective.
There is no duty to treat when treatment is judged to be 
useless, nor a duty to treat when treatment is deemed extraor-
dinary. Although today “proportionate” and “disproportion-
ate” are terms which may be used instead of ordinary versus 
extraordinary, the latter are not only still the most commonly 
used terms, but they are probably the best guideline to make 
a judgment on risk–benefit. However, one must clearly 
understand the meaning of “extraordinary” to make best use 
of the term, and for this one must look at its original Catholic 
origins. Extraordinary means of preserving life are “all medi-
cine, treatments, and operations, which cannot be obtained or 
used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience 
for the patient or for others, or which, if used, would not offer 
reasonable hope of benefit to the patient”.11
A closer look at this definition shows how this covers 
most, if not all, legal issues that may arise when making 
moral choices on risk–benefit. When assessing risk, we are 
indeed facing the particular and singular clinical picture of 
this patient, including fitness for surgery, side effects and 
interaction of drugs, wishes of the patient, and physical 
state of the patient. The definition clearly does not take into 
account the state-of-the-art of medicine and technology, and 
something that is considered extraordinary today may by no 
means remain so tomorrow. Conversely, something that is 
quite ordinary treatment in one country, either because of Clinical Interventions in Aging 2010:5 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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culture or economic status, may indeed be extraordinary in 
another. Family need not be put to excessive burden, espe-
cially if they are required to pay or to go through extraordi-
nary measures to meet the patient’s needs. Clearly, where 
insurance and state cannot or will not pay, the family cannot 
morally be held responsible to take all measures necessary 
(in Malta, it has almost become a societal pressure to go 
to the UK for care when one finds no hope on the island, 
even if consultants say that no further treatment can be 
found there). Of particular note is that even medicines and 
excessive expense are mentioned in the definition, along 
with pain and   inconvenience to the patient or family. Hence 
a treatment which cannot be afforded or which will cause 
prolonged agony need not be given. Therefore, we are not 
merely speaking of futile treatment.
The third category is that of COPE. These issues are 
mostly found in outpatient and community settings of family 
practice, and deal with the chronic and palliative. Although 
Jonsen et al lament that the ethical issues here may be less 
evident, they in fact may represent the same issues discussed 
above. COPE is a good acronym because in fact we are 
working with the patient to “cope” with the illness. Although 
the same goals of preserving life, preserving function, and 
reducing pain and suffering are used, they take on a more 
patient-centered approach and reach compromises with the 
patient that allow him or her to participate in the treatment. 
Whilst there may be no drama as in life-and-death situations, 
there is a quality-of-life perspective and also end-of-life 
decision-making to face. The American College of Family 
Physicians have recently paid much attention to helping 
families cope with end-of-life and also address the cultural 
aspects of individuals and families.12 This departs consider-
ably from the earlier days of bioethics when autonomy meant 
revealing everything to the patient and almost burdening the 
patient with information, giving details in order to allow them 
to feel they were making a choice, or preferably making the 
choice themselves. This renewed cultural sensitivity brings 
back the onus on the practitioner to be truly patient-centered 
and to share the burden with the patient who usually indeed 
seeks the doctors’ advice. The bigger burden lies with dif-
ficult patients, ie, those who are noncompliant and those who 
pose problems such as never being fully satisfied. In these 
situations, the doctor may be impelled to transfer the care 
to someone else, because a breakdown of the relationship is 
perceived to have occurred. Yet COPE strongly nurtures the 
doctor–patient relationship as well as compromise, and this 
may in turn translate into breakdown occurring less often. 
Legal issues may arise with the family, who may not be 
  satisfied with the care imparted to their parents. However, we 
need to acknowledge in this regard that the involvement of the 
family as a community-based approach to treating the elderly 
is still compatible with the patient-centered approach.13
Social understanding of aging
Of course the concept of aging has changed over time. Today, 
with discourse on aging, one may find less difficulty with, 
eg, an elderly man seeking help for erectile dysfunction. 
Yet many bioethics committees recommend against women 
  having fertility treatment beyond their menopausal age. With 
advancing technology, the right to treatments, perhaps with 
aging populations, will probably give ground to the yearning 
of the elderly spirit to continue enjoying life beyond the social 
boundaries thus far accepted. Leon Kass, former chairman of 
the US Council on Bioethics, found considerable opposition 
to his general wariness about reproductive technology and 
efforts to forestall aging.14
Therefore, risk–benefit analysis cannot look at the social 
concept of aging in a postmodern and perhaps posthuman 
society. These changes may be sudden or slow but they will 
occur. The concern for us now lies in making the same analy-
sis of legality in risk-benefit not only with regard to medical 
care but also in terms of research, this being imperative to the 
advancement of medicine. We have to decide which research 
is moral and which not to finance with public funds. There 
are strong arguments for the moral imperative to research 
elderly subjects further, even though research in this realm 
is both “ethically required and ethically suspect”.15 Do we 
carry out research in order to increase longevity, to curb the 
aging process, or even perhaps to stop aging all together? 
Whereas better cures and medical advances have already 
brought this out, it was never really a medical imperative. 
It was, at most, a welcome, although perhaps foreseen conse-
quence of treatment and care. Yet the line is quickly drawing 
a distinction between a rise in the elderly population due 
to better survival and a deliberate search for survivorship 
and longevity, although such research into the genome and 
molecular cell biology is rapidly becoming hazy.
In discussing aging and the sociology of embodiment, 
Featherstone and Hepworth16 give an interesting account 
worth reflecting upon. At the end of the day, the body is the 
bottom line, when we survive to advanced old age.17 Elias, in 
his old age acknowledged, with an air almost of awe, that there 
is a “simple reality” of a finite life.18 Therefore, the “body in 
decline”, for Featherstone and Hepworth,19 is a central issue 
for contemporary society to come to terms with. They assert 
that this does not mean that historically, when life expectancy Clinical Interventions in Aging 2010:5 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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was much shorter, people did not strive to prolong their life. 
Fear of death, intensity of bereavement, and the longing for 
earthly pleasures are all issues to be faced.
It is precisely in the struggle to reconstruct this cultural 
inheritance of pessimism that the element of difference 
between past and present attitudes towards aging through the 
later period of the life course may be found.19,20 This recon-
struction, according to these social authors, lies in moving 
away from the pessimistic and melancholic processes of aging 
to one of optimism and a period enriched with distinctive 
creative possibilities.16 Only in this way can the structure of 
feeling and attitudes towards aging be changed, especially 
with regard to the aging body. This “social reconstruction” 
(or better, “change in social acceptance”), will then perhaps 
illuminate our attitude towards caring for our elderly in a new 
way and not simply as seeing them one of the “vulnerable” 
populations, even though they may be. We may see new light 
in research into the elderly and perhaps even in some form of 
longevity and prevention of body decline, which would bring 
with it a continuation of activity, be this sexual, educational, 
or occupational. We are already seeing countries prolong the 
retirement age due to improved standards of living and quality 
of life, and this not merely because elderly populations are on 
the rise and we need to continue collecting taxes from them.
In understanding our ethical and legal attitudes to the 
risk and benefits of treatment, we must indeed be wary 
therefore of any desire by groups, such as practitioners of 
geriatric medicine, to make claims of a specialized form of 
knowledge and to legitimize the imposition of controls over 
aging members of the population.21 One should not take this 
to mean that geriatric medicine should not exist, but to entail 
a change in concept even of the discipline itself. It need be an 
“advocate”, much as family doctors are advocates for seeing 
the family more consistently in the biopsychosocial dimen-
sion, acting as family counselors and advocates for patient 
rights. Notwithstanding the discipline of geriatrics and the 
vulnerability experienced by an increased percentage of this 
sector of the population, we cannot continue to see old age 
as a form of pathology and the body in decline as a medical-
ized entity, which according to Katz, is an accusation often 
leveled at medicine. Perhaps we need to understand that the 
“stages” model of life is a cultural cliché, as are expressions 
like “ticking of the clock”.22
Should we strive for technologic 
advancement of aging?
“The implications for the sociology of ageing are clear: it is 
no longer possible to make adequate generalizations about the 
aging process that are grounded on biological assumptions 
about the ages of life. Nor is it particularly useful to adopt 
schemata of the life course based upon loosely conceptual-
ized models of unspecified processes of interaction between 
the ontologically distinctive entities, body, self and society. 
As a consequence contemporary models of ageing into old 
age must be increasingly post-modern, by which we mean 
they must anticipate even more advanced forms of biocul-
tural destabilization”.16 These authors eloquently argue how 
our struggle is not really with biologic decline, but with the 
social construction of aging that has been the center of debate. 
Hormone replacement therapy, even if it had an element 
of success, was more about “remaining young and active”, 
hidden behind the excuse of better heart and skin outcomes, 
until the reality of the cancer issue came to light, ie, some-
thing which many were very skeptical about from the outset. 
The social pressure to take hormone replacement therapy 
cannot be denied, in that many women may have taken it 
seeking a better skin complexion and less wrinkling, or at 
least have been encouraged to take the medication for these 
reasons. It is interesting that postmodern feminist studies 
of the interpretation of aging were associated with wisdom. 
Before patriarchal societies, the female crone was seen as a 
naturalistic and matriarchal part of life, with wrinkles being 
badges of honor.23 History has brought about a separation of 
the self from the body and society, and the seeking of youth 
is found at the base of this force. Whether this is the result 
of patriarchal influence which feminism blames is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The profound reality is that it is an 
existential issue and an entity to be reckoned with. This dual-
ism, ie, the separation of the self from the body, lies in the 
very nature of the fear of aging in terms of a declining body. 
“If I were twenty years younger …” is an expression that 
perhaps was less heard in primitive society, which adorned 
their elders with a wisdom and respect much less seen today. 
This lies at the heart and concept of the recent change towards 
end-of-life decision-making. Western culture is learning yet 
again from populations which lagged behind the materialistic 
taint and preserve many of their traditional values, and such 
is the case for Eastern countries.
There is, however, a downside to this reasoning. It lies 
in the nonacceptance of current culture. Featherstone and 
Hepworth continue to make the argument that whilst accept-
ing the limits of the body and the aging process as having its 
own rewards, they adopt a negative attitude to technologic 
advances whereby medical intervention, such as hormone 
replacement therapy, is a possibility. Nowadays, in ethical 
circles, words like “fundamentalism” and “relativism” are Clinical Interventions in Aging 2010:5 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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often used in an accusatory fashion. This war of words does 
not reflect a dispute but a conflict. Thus, the main question 
would be whether hormone replacement therapy is unnatural 
and a threat to womanhood? Indeed, there is much sense 
in not seeing technology as an external factor to human 
nature, but as a relationship between nature and the human 
bodily nature (the creator of the technology itself), which 
is a   culturally dynamic process. We have stopped seeing 
technology as part of our nature, because it is human nature 
which creates it, just as a monkey uses a stick, and perhaps 
moral discourse is more based on a fear of progress rather 
than a balancing of moral choices.
Treatment and medicalization
When seen in this light, we are be forced to accept a change 
in balancing risk as opposed to benefit. Whilst medicine has 
been attacked for being paternalistic and indeed   domineering, 
in a Foucaultian sense, the sociology of medicine shows 
that the truth lies perhaps somewhere else. It is the world in 
  general that has strived for technology and improvement of 
the human condition. Medicine has certainly taken advantage 
of new technologies for better cure rates, but research is often 
not carried out by “medicine” as such, but by   corporations 
who strive to satisfy the thirst of society, and profit of 
course in the process. There is a delicate, and sometimes 
controversial, balance with cultural and religious values. 
Certainly we question to what extent we want technology 
to influence the human condition. There is nostalgia, ie, a 
longing to remain attached to certain roots.24 The reality of 
the new field of bioethics, as opposed to the centuries old 
Hippocratic tradition, emerged at a time when technology 
was also blooming.
Therefore, we may still be tied to concepts of not treating 
the elderly because of their age. Does one treat a 94-year-
old woman who has developed breast cancer? The balance 
between cultural nontelling, and indeed giving a treatment 
adequate to what the body can withstand (it would be 
unwise to opt for surgery, but certainly a long-term course 
of   tamoxifen, even if palliation is not needed) is not that 
difficult to conceive. However, accepting cultural criteria, 
such as the children of this woman, indeed in their late 60s 
themselves, of not giving her the bad news, even if she had 
never explicitly expressed a wish not to know, is the morally 
(and perhaps legally) correct thing to do.
What is probably wrong in our approach to the elderly is 
to see the changing body as a pathologic process. Even if we 
can come to accept change in body parts, better   appearance, 
etc, as socially acceptable, there will always be a time of 
reckoning with death and the human condition. Decline 
begins very early on in life, perhaps immediately after peak 
physical growth is reached. There are certainly problems 
that affect the elderly more, as there are problems that affect 
children more. Mallia and Fiorini25 have argued for separate 
surgical lists for the elderly to enhance “life to years” rather 
than “years to life”. Two years for a 70-year-old is a larger 
proportion of one’s remaining lifespan than the same number 
of years for a 40-year-old. Utilitarian attitudes have been 
carefully avoided in bioethics.
Conclusion
Certainly balancing risks and benefits may not work out in 
favor of the elderly person. A new social awareness towards 
aging helps cultivate an attitude that old age is worthwhile for 
what it “is” rather than for what the elderly do or what they 
have. Whilst looking at the risk and benefit of treatment, we 
cannot ignore the larger risk–benefit picture of what research 
and medicine hold in the future. Advanced research must 
be respected as part of the human need to ask, invent, and 
discover. However, a balance must be struck so as not to 
uproot people from their cultures because this is what gives 
people their identities. Simone Weil warns against uprooting 
people, cautioning that “uprootedness” leads to misery and 
spiritual lethargy on one hand and to violent efforts to adapt 
and uproot those not already uprooted.
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